Protecting Cultural Monuments Against Terrorism by Frey, Bruno S & Rohner, Dominic
 
 
 
 
 
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics 
University of Zurich 
 
Working Paper Series 
ISSN 1424-0459 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 257 
Protecting Cultural Monuments Against Terrorism 
 
Bruno S. Frey and Dominic Rohner 
                November 2005  
 
 
 
 
 1
Protecting Cultural Monuments Against 
Terrorism 
 
Bruno S. Frey◊                         Dominic Rohner° 
                 (University of Zurich)                             (University of Cambridge) 
22 November 2005 
 
Abstract: Famous cultural monuments are often regarded as unique icons, making them an 
attractive target for terrorists. Despite huge military and police outlays, terrorist attacks on 
important monuments can hardly be avoided. We argue that an effective strategy for 
discouraging terrorist attacks on iconic monuments is for the government to show a firm 
commitment to swift reconstruction. Using a simple game-theoretic model, we demonstrate 
how a credible claim to rebuild any cultural monuments destroyed discourages terrorist 
attacks by altering the terrorists’ expectations and by increasing the government’s reputation 
costs if they fail to rebuild. 
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Protecting Cultural Monuments Against 
Terrorism 
 
I. Terrorism and Cultural Monuments 
“Cultural Monuments” are understood here to be the most important buildings representing 
a nation’s cultural identity. They are sometimes monuments of great historical importance (as 
e.g. St. Peter’s Basilica in Rome), but often they are “icons” with which the whole nation 
identifies itself (such as the Americans with the Statue of Liberty in New York). Cultural 
monuments are universally famous and therefore an attractive target for terrorists. It is well 
known (see Hoffman 1989, Crelinsten 1990, Wilkinson 2000, Frey 2004) that a major goal of 
terrorists is to gain media attention. Indeed, one can speak of a symbiotic relationship: 
terrorists depend on the media, and the media profit from reporting terrorist attacks (Frey and 
Luechinger 2003, Frey and Rohner 2005). If, for instance, the “Eiffel Tower” in Paris was to 
be blown up in a terrorist attack, this would generate a huge amount of media attention, 
therewith publicizing the respective terrorists’ goals. 
Governments are, of course, aware of this danger and seek to protect their cultural 
monuments. They take defensive measures, either by closing the sites completely, or severely 
restricting access, causing considerable utility losses to prospective visitors. Such precautions 
also cause high direct costs in terms of manpower and material. Nevertheless, experts are well 
aware that terrorist attacks are an ever-present threat. Thus, for example, Palac-McMiken 
(2005) shows for the transport sector that countering the terrorist risk is extremely costly and 
that it is impossible to remove the risk of terror attacks completely. When discussing 
terrorism, the ECONOMIST (8th October 2005, p. 12) accordingly entitles its article: “The 
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bomber will always get through”. This makes it clear that “where there’s a will, there’s a 
way”.  No matter what precautionary measures are taken, some cultural monuments will 
remain subject to terrorist attacks and thus liable to being completely or partially destroyed in 
the future. 
We suggest that, in many cases, an attractive – if somewhat unorthodox – strategy is to 
reduce defensive protection measures to a minimum, but to be fully prepared for the 
eventuality and build a rapid and identical reconstruction once an (unavoidable) terrorist 
attack has occurred. Modern technology allows us to rebuild a monument (almost) identical to 
the original and to restore it to its former glory. Well-known examples are the Frauenkirche in 
Dresden or the Chapel Bridge in Lucerne. This strategy reduces major direct and indirect 
utility losses due to protective measures. Most importantly, terrorists are rational enough to 
comprehend that the cultural monument will be rapidly restored, which the media will claim 
as a victory over terrorism. The terrorists therefore have less incentive to undertake the attack 
in the first place.  
Section II models the presumed interaction between terrorists and the government and 
section III presents some evidence about the possibilities and costs of reconstructing a cultural 
monument. Section IV concludes. 
 
II. Model of the Interaction Between the Terrorists and the 
Government 
The a posteriori decision of the government whether or not to rebuild a  national icon in 
case it gets destroyed influences the a priori decision of the terrorists whether or not to attack 
a particular national icon. If terrorists expect the national monument to be rebuilt, they are less 
likely to attack it in the first place, as they would like to make a long-lasting symbolic impact. 
Thus, expectations are of crucial importance for the present issue. An important question to 
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ask is: Can the terrorists’ expectations be influenced in such a way as to lower the risk of 
them being motivated to carry out a terrorist attack?  
The fundamental features of the question posed are similar to some models of financial 
crisis. In particular, the model of Obstfeld (1986) is relevant. The main focus is on 
expectations, self-fulfilling prophecies and policy recommendations. 
Equation (1) displays the loss function of the government of a given country.  
 
(1) crErL +−= )(βα  
 
where α =parameter, r=relative cost of reconstruction (if alternative policies are taken into 
account), β =parameter, E(r)=expected value of r, c=reputation cost of not rebuilding the 
national monument after it has been destroyed. 
 
The term E(r) corresponds to the expectations of the public, which includes investors, 
lobbies and potential terrorists. If the public thinks that the state will rebuild the icon 
destroyed, E(r)=r, whereas if reconstruction is not anticipated, E(r)=0. The expression )(rEβ  
has a negative sign, as it is cheaper in the long run to rebuild a national monument if the 
public believes that the state is determined to carry out the reconstruction. Lobbies may 
advocate another use for the area of land where the monument once stood if the government 
does not seem absolutely determined to rebuild the icon, and investors may hesitate to invest 
money in a project if they are not convinced that it will indeed be completed.  
The reputation cost of not rebuilding is c. It represents the cost of the prestige loss due to 
the icon being destroyed and the reputation cost of being perceived as a “lame duck” 
government. 
As shown in figure 1, when reconstruction is very costly and when the reputation cost of 
not rebuilding is very low, i.e. when rc )( βα −< , the government will never rebuild and the 
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terrorists will always attack. By contrast, when reconstruction is relatively inexpensive, and 
when the credibility cost of not rebuilding is high, i.e. when rc α> , the government will 
always rebuild the icon and the terrorists will never attack. 
 
Figure 1: Government action and terrorist action for different values of c 
 
 
 
There is a zone of ambiguity in between those two clear-cut cases where expectations are 
important. Both the government and the terrorists are assumed to undertake Bayesian 
updating. They know both their own expectations and those of the opponent, and assume that 
the opponent is consistent and correct in his beliefs. In this ambiguity zone, expectations are 
self-fulfilling and multiple equilibria emerge. 
If the terrorists and the rest of the public expect that the government  will not rebuild the 
national icon after an attack, 0)( =rEβ . In the case of rc α< , the terrorists will attack because 
they expect that the government will not rebuild the monument. In the case of rc α> , the 
terrorists will not attack because they expect that the government will rebuild the monument. 
By contrast, if the terrorists and the rest of the public believe that the government will 
rebuild the monument after an attack, rrE ββ =)( . This results in the terrorists attacking 
because they believe the government will not rebuild the monument in the case of rc )( βα −< , 
(α-β)r αr 
Terrorists will attack Terrorists will not attack 
Government will not reconstruct Government will reconstruct 
Zone of ambiguity 
c 
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and in the terrorists not attacking because they believe the government will rebuild the 
cultural monument in the case of rc )( βα −> . 
To summarize, in the zone of ambiguity, terrorists attack if the government does not seem 
determined to rebuild the monument, and terrorists do not attack if the government is able to 
convince them and the public of its determination to rebuild the monument in case of an 
attack. 
Thus, by showing strong determination and commitment, the government can avoid 
terrorist attacks in the zone of ambiguity, and can at the same time increase the credibility cost 
of not rebuilding c, which also deters terrorists from attacking.  
Measures of showing more commitment include public announcements, drawing up 
reconstruction plans or putting the necessary amount of money on a blocked bank account. 
 
III. Evidence About the Possibilities and the Costs of 
Reconstruction 
This paper argues that a cost-effective way of diminishing the risk of cultural monuments 
being destroyed is for the government to be totally committed to rebuilding them in case of a 
terrorist attack. However, to discourage an attack, this commitment to reconstruction has to be 
credible. Reconstruction has to be technically and financially feasible. 
There do not seem to be any empirical estimates for the costs of protecting a cultural 
monument from terrorist attacks and of reconstructing such a monument after the terrorists 
have struck. Obviously, the relative costs vary considerably according to what kind of 
monument we are dealing with and the extent to which it has been damaged by a successful 
terrorist attack. Total destruction seems to be an unlikely scenario; in most cases, a monument 
is only partially destroyed. This has, for instance, been the case even after prolonged 
bombardments from airplanes. Thus, the Frauenkirche in Dresden, which was subject to 
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heavy bombing by the Royal Air Force in February 1945, and which collapsed two days later, 
was not totally destroyed. In the reconstruction, completed in October 2005, parts of the walls 
still standing were reintegrated, as well as part of the building materials still on the site. 
The Frauenkirche in Dresden provides a good example of a successful and economically 
feasible reconstruction of an icon. The rebuilding of this church began in 1994, almost 50 
years after it was destroyed. The reconstruction cost amounts to about $130 million. Modern 
technology enabled this “unique” monument to be rebuilt so that it closely resembled its 
original state. The restored baroque altar, for example, was assembled using more than 2000 
pieces of debris. 
More than half of the reconstruction costs were financed by charity donations from all over 
the world. Taking future benefits from tourism into account, this reconstruction is also 
justifiable from an economic point of view. 
Other examples of successful reconstructions include the famous wooden bridge of 
Lucerne after it was destroyed by fire, or the complete reconstruction of the old part of 
Warsaw. 
A recent report from the UNESCO (2004) calculates the costs of reconstruction or 
renovation for 28 different cultural monuments in Kosovo, which were partially or totally 
destroyed by the armed conflict. These monuments include churches, monasteries and 
historical buildings. On average, the funds needed for a complete reconstruction or renovation 
amounted to about $830’000 per monument. The costs of reconstruction thus appear to be 
quite low.  
No general estimates are available for the costs of partially or totally rebuilding a 
monument. Reconstruction seems to be a relatively cheap option compared to high level 
security measures and restrictions. A RAND study by Zycher (2003) considers, for instance, 
the direct monetary costs of counterterrorism in the United States. He documents that US 
federal spending increased by $95 billion in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, a 
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substantial part of which was used for deterrence measures involving police and military 
outlays. Zycher also computes long-run expenditures for counter-terrorism according to 
different scenarios. For the “moderate case”, counter-terrorism expenditures are expected to 
amount to $10 billion per year, whereas for the “severe case” and the “nuclear case”, they 
would be respectively about $200 billion or $300 billion per year.  
It is not feasible to provide any general estimates of the benefit-cost ratios of either 
protecting an iconic monument against terrorist attacks or of preparing for a rapid rebuilding 
in case it is attacked and damaged. Accordingly, neither of the two policies can be considered 
superior in any general way. Rather than siding with one policy or the other, this paper 
proposes reconstruction as a possibility, which the literature so far has rarely, if ever, 
considered as an alternative to anti-terror policy. 
While no general evaluation of the benefit-cost ratio of the two policies is possible, the 
major cost components can nevertheless be identified. Depending on the particular cost 
situation, or relative prices in a given country (e.g. the labor costs are higher in a rich 
economy than in a poor economy), the balance of economic advantage is tilted in favor of one 
or the other policy. 
As has been pointed out, the protection policy is not able to ensure that an iconic 
monument will never be attacked. What it can achieve is a smaller or greater reduction in the 
probability of attack. The probability of attack may vary enormously from one monument to 
another. Some monuments can quite effectively be protected by structures prohibiting cars 
loaded with explosives coming anywhere near the building; in other cases, a small number of 
guards can achieve the same effect. In many cases, however, it takes a substantial number of 
guards protecting a monument day and night to significantly reduce the probability of attack 
and prevent serious damage. In view of the high labor costs, such protection is expensive in 
highly developed economies. 
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A major cost of the reconstruction policy lies in making elaborate plans for rebuilding. A 
high level of expertise is necessary in these areas. The corresponding costs are lower in 
developed economies with more sophisticated planning and building technology than in less 
developed economies. In any event, it is reasonable to undertake some degree of protection, 
but the level of protection could be considerably lower. 
With these considerations in mind for rebuilding a similar iconic monument, poorer 
countries might find it advantageous to lean more towards a protective policy, while richer 
countries might lean more towards a policy of reconstruction. This does not necessarily mean 
that richer countries will find that the optimal solution is to rely mainly on reconstruction; the 
iconic monuments may be of a nature which makes it very expensive to rebuild, for instance 
because it requires high labor input to achieve. Conversely, poorer countries may well rely on 
the rebuilding strategy in the case of monuments where it is relatively inexpensive and easy to 
carry out. 
The benefit-cost ratios used to compare the two policies should not be confined to material 
and labor costs. The two policies also entail differences in the extent to which access to the 
sites is made more difficult. This causes a loss due to the reduced exposure to a “national 
icon”. An extreme example is when a monument no longer serves the purpose for which it 
was built. Another cost to be taken into consideration is the possible loss of human rights 
produced by an anti-terrorist policy (see for example Mueller 2004, Roth 2004, Foot 2005, 
Gearty 2005). Taking both types of costs into consideration, the reconstruction policy seems 
to have a definite advantage.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
The present contribution deals with the protection of cultural monuments (“icons”) against 
terrorist attacks. Using a simple game-theoretic model, it is shown that, by committing 
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themselves to the reconstruction of icons which are destroyed, the government reduces the 
terrorist threat. Measures of commitment such as public announcements, the availability of 
detailed reconstruction plans, and the creation of blocked bank accounts alter the terrorists’ 
expectations and raise the loss of reputation if the government reneges from its commitment. 
As a result, terrorists are discouraged from attacking. Determination to rebuild the monument 
in case of a terrorist attack has the consequence that reconstruction is often no longer 
necessary. 
Preliminary evidence suggests that the reconstruction of attacked icons is, in many cases, 
less costly than expenditures for deterrence which, moreover, will never be able to provide 
complete protection against terrorist attacks. Reconstruction appears to be a technically and 
economically attractive policy option, which should be taken into consideration as a part of 
anti-terrorist policy. 
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